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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
BATTERY SUBSYSTEM 
By J. Bar ry  Trou t  
Manned Spacecraft Center 
SUMMARY 
The requirements established for the Apollo command-service module and lunar 
module batteries were well within the existing state of the art for batteries; hence, no 
unique problems were identified o r  experienced during battery development and quali- 
fication o r  during short-time unmanned flights. 
I The only significant problems resulted from the use of a relatively new type of 
nonabsorbent separator  (Permion 307) in the command module entry and postlanding 
batteries and from failure to verify the  effectiveness of the battery-charging system 
for those batteries. These two factors jointly resulted in severe  undervoltage a t  the 
command module main buses at command module/service module separation during 
I the Apollo 7 mission. The final solution of these problems for the flight of Apollo 11 
w a s  achieved by reverting to the original absorbent cellophane separator material 
1 
I 
and by raising the output voltage of the command module battery charger. 
With the possible exception of auxiliary battery 2 in the unmanned Apollo 6 flight 
I (insufficient data to prove a battery failure), no battery failure occurred in any flight through the Apollo 16  mission. This is proof that the design- and verification-test 
principles were valid and that procedures and cr i te r ia  for acceptance testing at the 
battery vendor's facility and preparation for flight at the Kennedy Space Center were 
effective in culling batteries that might fail in flight. 
~ 
I 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
The batteries discussed herein a r e  the operational flight batteries developed for 
use  in the Apollo spacecraft. The report  includes a discussion of the command module 
(CM) entry and postlanding batteries and battery charger ,  the lunar module (LM) main 
power batteries, and the CM and LM pyrotechnic batteries. This report  does not in- 
clude a discussion of the miscellaneous off-the-shelf batteries used in  the various de- 
velopmental boilerplate flights. All  Apollo batteries were of the silver-oxide/zinc 
alkaline type. The LM main power batteries were  pr imar ies  (single discharge), where- 
as the CM batteries and all pyrotechnic batteries were low-cycle life secondaries 
(rechargeable). The Apollo 7 to 13 missions a r e  covered. 
COMMAND-SERVICE MODULE BATTERIES 
The unmanned command-service module (CSM) flights used from two to eight 
entry batteries in the command and service modules, two pyrotechnic batteries in the 
CM, and two pyrotechnic batteries in the SM to supply power to mission-sequencing 
Electr icdl  
c o n t r o l  a s w n b l y  
,-Aft equiprnent bay 
control devices and service module (SM) 
jettison control devices. The manned ve- 
hicles used three entry batteries and two 
pyrotechnic batteries, all in the CM. The 
mounting locations of the various batteries 
used in manned missions are shown in 
figures 1 to 3. 
Pyro techn ic  battery A 
Pyro techn ic  battery B 
I n v e r t e r  2 I n v e r t e r  3 
I n v e r t e r  dc \ Battery cha rge r  
7- Bat te rv  A /.-- To battery vent valve on  
waste-management pane l  
Battery vent l i n e  
Battery C -/ Battery B 
Figure 1. - Command module battery 
and charger locations in  the lower 
equipment bay (block 11). 
l n v e r  
Fo r+w; rd 
(a) Ascent components. 
(b) Descent components. 
Figure 2. - Locations of LM main 
electrical power system 
components. 
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Entry and Postlanding Batteries 
The entry and postlanding batteries 
were used to supplement the main CSM 
system gimbaling); to supply certain para- 
power source (that is, the fuel cells) during 
peak loads (for example, service propulsion 
sitic loads that had to be kept separate from 
the CM main direct-current (dc) buses; and, 
after CM/SM separation, to supply all CM 
electrical loads. 
&I 
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b a ~  ' 2 1  
Figure 3. - Locations of L'M explosive- The original version of the entry and 
device batteries. postlanding battery had a capacity of 25 A-h. 
The battery had a welded titanium case and a 
machined, anodized- magnesium cover. A 
coat of beryllium-aluminum paint was applied for increased emissivity and for  corro- 
sion resistance. The plate-separator material in the cells was Permion 307, an irra- 
diated polyethylene film selected because of its thermal resistance. A thermal 
environment of 250" F in the CM lower equipment bay was expected for  approximately 
30 minutes because of entry heating. The available energy was 725 W-h p e r  battery at 
29 volts o r  2175 W-h pe r  shipset of three batteries. The battery had to be capable of 
six charges and discharges, the discharges consisting of 30 minutes at 35 amperes  
and then 225 minutes at 2 . 0  amperes  (all at more than 27 volts). 
The 25-A-h battery was qualified but was never flown. By means of better defi- 
nition of the block I1 vehicle battery-energy requirements, it was shown in mid-1964 
that the required entry and postlanding energy was 2234 W-h, which exceeded the en- 
ergy available even without a battery failure. It was determined that the batteries 
should be capable of 40 A-h (1160 W-h each) to satisfy vehicle requirements with one 
allowable battery failure. In October 1964, a contractor was authorized to proceed 
with battery redesign. 
The 40-A-h battery also contained Permion 307 plate-separator material  and 
required additional active material  to deliver the additional energy. 
rial was changed to cemented Plexiglas, which was enveloped in  glass-reinforced epoxy 
and covered with gray plastic paint. Also, this battery had to yield six complete 
charge/discharge cycles. The discharge profile was changed to  25 amperes  for  1 hour 
and 2 amperes  for  7 .5  hours; a 25-ampere load was more representative of spacecraft 
battery loads. The weight and dimensions of the 40-A-h battery are shown in table I. 
The voltage-current characterist ics of this battery are shown in figure 4. This battery 
was qualified and flown on all Apollo missions through Apollo 13. 
The case mate- 
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T A B L E  I. - BATTERY DESCRIPTION 
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Item 
Voltage, nominal, V . . . . . .  
Number of ce l l s  . . . . . . . .  
Capacity rating, A-h . . . . .  
Dimensions, nominal 
Length, in. . . . . . . . . .  
Width, a in.  . . . . . . . . .  
Height, in. . . . . . . . . .  
Weight, Ib . . . . . . . . . . .  
Type of te rmina l  . . . . . . .  
Quantity used p e r  vehicle . . .  
Location . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Thermal-control method . . .  
Entry  and 
postlanding 
battery,  25 A-h 
29 
20 
25 
10.15 
6. 4 
5. 75 
22 
Stud and  nut 
(b) 
CM 
P a s s i v e  
dExcludes mounting r a i l s  where  applicable. 
bNever flown. 
'32' F coolant. 
Entry and 
postlanding 
battery,  40 A-h 
29 
20 
40 
11.75 
5.15 
6.875 
28.5 
Stud and nut 
3 
CM 
Pass ive  
Short-term loading from full  charge at room temperature 
I I I I I I I 
22 .24 26 28 30 32 34 36 
Voltage. V dc 
Pyrotechnic 
battery 
20 (minimum) 
20 
.I5 
6.25 
2.635 
2.87 
3. 5 
Stud and nut 
2 
CM and LM 
CM: pass ive  
LM: coldplate' 
LM ascent -  
s tage  
battery 
29 
20 
296 
35.75 
4.95 
7. 70 
123. I 
Stud and nut 
2 
LM 
Coldplate' 
LM descent- 
s tage  
battery 
29 
20 
400 
16.94 
9. 04 
9.96 
132.7 
itud and nut 
4 
LM 
Coldplate' 
Operational performance. - Perform- 
ance was nominal on all unmanned missions. 
Each of these missions lasted l e s s  than 
0. 5 day; consequently, the spacecraft under- 
went very little zero-gravity time. However, 
in postflight t e s t s  of the eight entry batteries 
in the Apollo 6 spacecraft (spacecraft 020), 
internal cell shorting was discovered in 
auxiliary battery 2. Four of the remaining 
batteries developed cell shor t s  within one 
charge/discharge cycle. Soon afterward, 
two test  batteries from spacecraft 007A at 
the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) failed 
in  the same way, as did a battery being used 
to  simulate the Apollo 7 mission perform- 
ance at a contractor facility. The shorting 
was the result  of zinc dendrites that had 
pierced the Permion 307 plate-separator 
material when ce l l s  were  subjected either to 
slight overcharge o r  to slight overdischarge. 
Because this type of failure had not occurred 
before in these cells,  it was concluded that 
the separator-material characterist ic had 
changed; however, this conclusion could not 
Figure 4. - Characteristics of the Apollo be verified. In response to an urgent recom- 
mendation by the vendor and based on revised entry and postlanding battery. 
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thermal  requirements,  a program was initiated to requalify the battery, using conven- 
tional cellulosic (cellophane) separator material that had an intermediate layer of 
plastic film. 
Apollo 7 Battery A 0 
A further indication that a change in separator material was required was ob- 
served in reduced battery-voltage characteristics after prolonged exposure of the bat- 
t e ry  to zero  gravity (fig. 5). The very low voltage shown for the Apollo 7 batteries 
(relative to those of Apollo 8) was caused by the unexpected inability to recharge the 
batteries fully. Although the reduced voltage-current characteristic could not be repro- 
duced in ground-based tests,  it was concluded that hydrogen bubbles, formed by natural 
gassing at the negative plate, displaced electrolyte between the plates. This phenom- 
enon is possible because the Permion separator is not absorptive and the hydrogen 
remains in place on the negative plates in zero  gravity. Loss of electrolyte decreases  
conductivity, lowering the voltage characteristic. After qualifying the battery contain- 
ing cellophane separators ,  one redesigned battery was flown on the Apollo 10 space- 
craft; on subsequent flights, all three batteries were of this design. The improvement 
obtained f rom the redesign is shown in figure 6. The absorptivity of the cellophane 
eliminated the zero-gravity effect by retention of the electrolyte between the plates. 
30 r 
\ 
25 1 I I I 1 I 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
Battery A or B current. A 
Figure 5. - Entry-battery flight- 
performance data at the t ime 
of CM/SM separation. 
25 I ' I I 1  I I I I I I 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
Current. A 
Figure 6. - Comparison of entry-battery 
character is t ics  at the t ime of CM/SM 
separation. 
Mounting. - The entry and postlanding battery was hung from its top surface in 
the lower equipment bay (fig. 7). Active thermal control was not required because of 
the mild thermal environment of the CM cabin. 
Figure 7. -The 100-ampere circuit 
breaker and entry-battery mount- 
ing adapter. 
Pyrotechnic  Battery 
No significant problems were encoun- 
te red  in the development of the pyrotechnic 
battery. Qualification was completed in 
July 1965. The CSM pyrotechnic battery 
has  been flown successfully on Apollo space- 
c raf t  f rom boilerplate 22 to Apollo 13. 
Performance requirements. - The 
salient electrical requirements were as fol- 
lows. The capacity was 75 amperes  for 
36 seconds at more  than 20 volts at 60" to 
143' F o r  f o r  15  secondsat  more than20volts 
at 50" ? 3" F. Regarding cycle life, the 
battery had to deliver 6 cycles of 75 amperes  
for  36 seconds at any t ime within 36 days 
after activation. The battery also had to 
satisfy the preceding requirements when 
activated after s torage for 1 gear  f rom the 
date of manufacture. The batteries were furnished in  the dry,  charged condition, and 
the electrolyte was supplied in separate  containers. The weight and dimensions of this 
battery a r e  given in table I. The separators  were three l aye r s  of cellophane (only). 
The battery case  was a hand-fabricated monobloc of G-10 circuit board, cemented to- 
gether and lined with an epoxy cement. The cell relief valves, which had cracking 
p res su res  of 2 to 1 0  psig, were vented into a manifold space that w a s  insulated from 
the intercell connectors; this space had a relief valve that had a cracking p res su re  of 
30 f 5 psig. 
Mounting. - The pyrotechnic battery was hung from its top surface in the right- 
hand equipment bay by four bolts (two at each end) that threaded into the structure.  
Active thermal control was  not required because of the mild thermal  environment of 
the CM cabin. 
Special Protective Devices 
Before the spacecraft 012 fire,  silicone-rubber potting was applied to all exposed 
terminal and cable-lug metallic surfaces  after the installation of the CM flight batter- 
ies .  (The potting was not used for  test  batteries. ) A s  a result  of the review after the 
fire, it was concluded that not only was the silicone rubber flammable but that the ex- 
posed terminals of the test batteries were  a spark source i f  shorted. It was also con- 
cluded that additional overload protection was required for the long cable that connected 
each entry battery to its circuit breaker  in the battery circuit-breaker panel (panel 250). 
Entry battery. - To provide additional circuit protection, a 1 00-ampere circuit 
breaker  was added at the battery. The battery mounting-adapter plate was extended 
downward to  provide a bracket so that the 100-ampere circuit breaker  could be con- 
nected to the battery by a very  short  cable. The use of silicone-rubber terminal pot- 
ting was discontinued; instead, a polyimide shield w a s  designed. The shield was 
attached to the mounting bracket and contained integrally molded baffles that blocked 
access  of s t r ay  mater ia ls  that might short  circuit either the battery o r  the circuit- 
breaker terminals.  
Pyrotechnic battery. - The use of silicone-rubber terminal potting was discontin - 
ued. Pod-shaped polyimide shields were designed. Each terminal had two shield 
halves: one shield half was mounted on the terminal behind the connecting cable lug; 
the other shield half, which enclosed the terminal and lug, snapped onto the first shield 
half. Because the pressurization-test plug on the terminal face of the battery physi- 
cally interfered with the installation of the pods, the plug had to be removed. 
Entry- Batte ry Charger 
The salient characterist ics of the 
entry-battery charger were as follows. 
The alternating-current (ac) input was 
115 to 200 volts, 400 hertz, three phase; 
the dc input was 28 volts. The output is 
shown in figure 8. The entry-battery 
charger weighed 4 . 3  pounds (maximum), 
and the maximum input power was 55 watts 
ac and 84 watts dc. A simplified schemat- 
ic of the charger electronics is shown in 
figure 9. No problems occurred during 
the development of this unit. Qualification 
was completed without complications in 
February 1966. 
40 I
0 . 5  1.0 1.5 2.0 2 . 5  
Output current. A 
Figure 8. - Characterist ics of 
entry-battery charger.  
Battery charger 
OFF 
... 
Current 
amplifier Schmitl trigger Voltage amplifier Comparator circuit 
I t 
Switch diode Battery C - 
1 - 
e I ,  10 M V dc 
II). 
Transformer ~~~~~~r Auxiliary 
power rectifier 
IUPPlY 
~ circuit 
0 c  dI 
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" B A  dl - 1 - I t 
i" 
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Figure 9. - Battery-charger functional diagram. 
Operation. - The charger  was operated manually by the crewmen. When a battery 
was to be charged, the charger  was  turned on, the battery was removed f rom the bat- 
te ry  relay bus, and charging power was applied to the battery through a selecting 
switch and the applicable battery bus (fig. 10). 
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Figure 10. - Battery circuits. 
Flight use. - Extensive testing and evaluation of the charger and entry battery 
were performed at a contractor facility and a t  the MSC to define the interdependent 
characteristics and rules fo r  inflight charging timing and termination. These labora- 
tory t e s t s  showed that the charger  could recharge the batteries fully in  a t ime approxi- 
mately equal to T = (A-ho/lA) + 0.5, where T is the t ime required for  charging, in 
hours, and A-ho is the ampere-hours removed f rom the battery. This relationship 
was based on terminating charges when the charger  current  decreased to 0.4 ampere.  
Typical charging curves f rom these tests a r e  shown in figure 11. 
8 
z.5r 
1 I I I I I I I I J 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9  
Time, hr 
Figure 11. - Entry-battery charging 
current  as a function of pr ior  
ampere-hours output. 
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Figure 12. - Charging experience for  
approximately 10 A-h output. 
The first formal test of the CM battery- 
charging system occurred during the flight 
of Apollo 7 (spacecraft 101). The batteries 
could not be recharged. A comparison of 
the expected and the actual performance of 
the Apollo 7 charging system is shown in 
figure 12. Postflight analysis showed that 
the line impedances between the charger and 
the battery (previously unevaluated) were 
sufficient to reduce significantly the charge 
voltage applied at the battery. The charger 
output voltage, although within specification 
limits, was on the low side of the allowable 
tolerances, aggravating the low-voltage con- 
dition. It was further postulated that the 
battery had a higher-than-expected internal 
resistance because of the gassing effects 
mentioned previously. 
Reduction of line impedances was not 
feasible for subsequent flights because it 
involved breaking into already fabricated, 
complex wiring harnesses.  Reduction of 
battery impedance by using absorbent cello- 
phane separators  was not feasible until 
the Apollo 1 0  mission. Although it was 
proven possible to dril l  a hole in  the charger 
down to the adjustment screw of an output 
potentiometer (raising the charger output 
voltage) and then reseal the charger,  the 
reliability of this adjustment could not be 
verified until after the Apollo 1 0  mission. 
Hence, for  the Apollo 8, 9, and 1 0  mis- 
sions, chargers  were selected that had out- 
puts on the high side of the specified voltage 
tolerances. Wherever necessary, chargers  
were removed from other command modules 
and installed in  the next flight vehicle. This procedure permitted full recharging but re- 
quired excessively long t imes (fig. 12) .  In the Apollo 11 and subsequent vehicles, 
chargers  were used that had adjusted outputs permitting charging at the rates expected 
before the Apollo 7 mission. The small  increase in voltage required to achieve this 
b improvement is shown in figure 13. 
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LUNAR MODULE BATTERIES 
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The LM battery complement consisted 
of two 29-volt, 296-A-h batteries in the 
ascent stage and four 29-volt, 400-A-h bat- 
teries in the descent stage. The LM origi- 
nally was configured for  fuel-cell power 
generation. Development of the LM fuel 
cell was begun with the contractor who de- 
veloped the CSM fuel-cell system. The LM 
fuel cell was to have the following general 
character ist ic s . 
1. Each of three fuel cells was to 
produce 32 kWh at 900 watts within the band 
of 27 to 36 volts. 
I I I I 2. The minimum load was to be 
\ 
*.' 100 watts. 35 5 1.0 1.5  2.0 Current, A 
3. The peak load was to be 1125 watts 
fo r  1 hour. Figure 13. - Characterist ics of entry- battery chargers  on the Apollo 7 I 
1 and 11 missions. 4. The fuel cell was to accept tran- 
sient load changes of 450 watts within volt- 
age regulation. 
5. Each fuel cell was to weigh 76 pounds (maximum). 
6. The fuel cells  were to be the open-cycle-operation type. 
I 
Regarding open-cycle operation, hydrogen was to be used both as a fuel and as a coolant, 
without recycling fuel. By this means, each fuel cell was not to dissipate more than 
75 Btu/hr at 160" F to the structure. By mid-1964, significant technical difficulties 
were being experienced in  both the CSM and LM fuel- cell developments. Additionally, 
the specified t ime from lunar lift-off to docking with the CSM was reduced more  than 
20 hours. The resulting decrease in energy requirements made a battery system fea- 
sible. 
the effect of converting to  a silver-oxide/zinc alkaline primary-battery power source. 
This type of battery was considered to be reliable, and was available off the shelf rela- 
tive to fuel cells, and had been flight proven during Project Mercury and the Gemini 
Program. In the study, it was shown that a battery system could be developed that 
could provide electrical power fo r  a 35-hour lunar stay but that would result  i n  approxi- 
mately 100 pounds more of power-system weight than would the fuel-cell system. A 
decision was made to accept this penalty as being favorable over the developmental and 
reliability r isks  assessed against the fuel cells. Therefore, the LM fuel-cell program 
was reduced in  April 1965 and terminated on June 30, 1965 (concurrent with the award- 
ing of the LM battery subcontract). The battery-system configuration that was selected 
was composed of two 8.7-kWh batteries in the LM ascent stage and four 11.6-kWh 
batteries in the descent stage (a total of 63.8 kWh of installed energy). 
A s  a consequence, a feasibility study was initiated by a contractor to evaluate 1 
J 
1 0  
Battery development began in June 1965 and culminated in battery qualification by 
March 1968. In addition to 20 monthly progress reports,  special reports were issued 
regarding ascent- and descent-battery efforts on the following subjects. 
1. High-temperature performance tes t s  
2. Electrolyte volume and cell position 
3. Thermal-runaway test 
4. Short-circuit t es t  (descent battery) 
5. Battery-container weight-reduction study 
6. Thermal- and ac-impedance tes t s  
7.  Specific-heat determination 
8. Regression analysis of process  and usage factors 
Capacity-prediction reports  were issued on the following subjects. 
1. Transient-voltage performance 
2. Separator- material selection and evaluation tes t s  
3. Systems simulation tes t s  
4. Ascent- and descent-battery load sharing 
5. Parametr ic  testing of electrical characterist ics 
6. Qualification tes t  
7 .  Postqualification tes t  
8. Supplemental qualification test 
An integrated thermal/electrical computer model of the ascent and descent batteries 
(as if mounted on the cold rails and surrounded by the LM structure in  space vacuum) 
was generated and was verified by the use of instrumentation on the LM-1 and LM-2 
flights. 
The only significant problem encountered in the development and qualification of 
the ascent batteries was undervoltage. This problem was encountered during large load 
transients related to single-battery aborts and abort- stage maneuvers. The problem 
was resolved by better definition of permissible maneuvers and by requiring "condition- 
ing" discharges of 2 .  5 to 20 A-h at low loads immediately before mission stages in- 
volving possible large load increases  on the ascent batteries. This procedure prevented 
undervoltage transients by a mechanism that is not fully understood at this time. 
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The only significant problem encountered in  the development and qualification of 
the descent batteries was random-vibration-test failures of the magnesium-alloy bat- 
tery container. Cracks occurred in the area where the ends and sides of the container 
were welded (just above the mounting rail). The failure mode was eliminated by adding 
a second gusset a t  the end of the mounting rail (fig. 14). 
h e l d  crack area 
Added gussel-../ 
(a) Failure configuration. (b) Corrected configuration. 
Figure 14. - Failure and corrected configurations of the  battery container. 
The explosive-devices (ED) battery was identical to the CSM pyrotechnic battery, 
except that the pressurization port was retained in  the ED battery. The ED battery was 
subjected to qualification tes t s  (in addition to those required for  CSM use)  to verify the 
ability of the battery to withstand LM-vibration spectra and thermal vacuum in  the cold- 
plated, thermally wrapped configuration. No difficulties relative to design o r  operation 
were encountered. 
Ascent - S tage Batteries 
The requirements for the ascent-stage batteries were as follows. The specified 
nominal capacity was 296 A-h within 28.0- to 32. 5-volt l imits and at rates equivalent 
to 350 to 1600 watts. The specified single-battery abort  capacity was 268 A-h within 
27. 5- to 32.5-volt l imits and at r a t e s  equivalent to  2200 to 3000 watts. The acceptance- 
tes t  capacity (sample cells only) was 296 A-h a t  50 amperes  to a minimum of 1 .41  volts 
pe r  cell. It was required that the specified nominal and abort  capacities be deliverable 
after idle stand for 30 days a t  80" F. The required capacity on the acceptance tes t  was 
determined after a 10-day charged stand at 95" F. The specified weight was a maxi- 
mum of 131.7 pounds (activated), and the qualified weight was 123. 7 pounds (activated). 
Dimensions and other pertinent data are summarized in  table I. The battery was 
mounted in the vehicle in such a way that the plane of the plates was perpendicular to 
the, natural gravity vector (earth or  moon). Originally, it was required that the battery 
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yield one 1 00-percent-capacity discharge and (with recharges)  two 85-percent-capacity 
discharges. The requirement for the las t  two cycles was  deleted because no charging 
is required in  flight. 
Descent-Stage Batteries 
The requirements for the descent-stage battery were as follows. The specified 
nominal capacity was 400 A-h within 28. 0- to 32. 5-volt l imits a t  a 25-ampere discharge 
rate. A tapped connection was provided from the 17th cell of the battery to prevent 
application of overvoltage to the LM systems at low loads when the battery w a s  a t  near- 
full capacity and could deliver the high silver dioxide voltage on discharge at low cur-  
rents. In a typical mission, the 17th-cell tap was used to supply small loads for 
heaters  in the LM only from prelaunch until after CSM transposition and docking. 
After this, these loads were supplied from the CSM through the CSM/LM umbilical 
until LM powerup, at which t ime the LM loads were high enough to depress  the voltage 
to acceptable levels. Use of the full battery or the 17th-cell tap was controlled manually 
by the LM crewmen. The specified contingency (one of four batteries failed) capacity 
was 389 A-h within 28. 0 to 32. 5 volts at ra tes  equivalent to 1 5  to 1330 watts. The con- 
tingency mission requirements resulted in higher individual battery loadings and a 
shortened lunar staytime. The acceptance-test (sample cells only) capacity was 
400 A-h at 25 amperes  to a minimum of 1.41 volts pe r  cell. The specified capacities 
were required to be delivered after the same wet-stand t ime periods and temperatures 
as were used for the ascent batteries. The specified weight was 139.6 pounds and the 
qualified weight w a s  132.7 pounds. Dimensions and other pertinent data are summa- 
rized in table I. The mounting orientation and the cycle-life information were the same 
as for the ascent-stage batteries. 
Explosive-Devices Battery 
The ED battery was identical to the CM pyrotechnic battery except that the pres -  
surization port  was retained in  the ED battery. The use  environment in the LM differed 
from that in the CSM; thus, the LM ED battery w a s  mounted on cold rails outside the 
pressurized cabin and was  wrapped in a thermal blanket to limit temperature extremes. 
The ED battery supplied power to the explosive devices that enabled such functions as 
staging, landing-gear extension, helium- and fuel-tank pressurization, and so forth. 1 
F l ight  Performance 
The LM ascent, descent, and ED batteries performed in accordance with specifi- 
cations and satisfied the electrical-energy requirements for all LM flights. The 
voltage-current character is t ics  of these batteries a r e  shown in figures 1 5  and 16. The 
performance of these batteries was  noteworthy during the rescue phase of the aborted 
Apollo 1 3  mission. The batteries supplied total vehicle power for 83 hours under con- 
ditions for which they had not been qualified o r  tested; that is, low electrical loads 
(350 watts compared with a nominal 1000 watts), continuous zero gravity while loaded, 
and continuous low temperature (approximately 37" F). Telemetry measurements 
indicated that two of the descent batteries were used 5 to 6 percent above the specified 
capacity. A CM entry battery was charged from LM battery power in preparation for  
CM/SM separation and CM entry. 
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Figure 16. - Characterist ics of the pyrotechnic and ED battery. 
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COMMAND MODULE BATTERY-FAILURE EXPER 
Entry and Postlanding Battery 
ENCE 
With the possible exception of the Apollo 6 auxiliary battery 2, for  which no telem- 
etry data are available for  verification of an inflight malfunction ("Operational perform- 
ance, ? *  p. 4), no inflight failure of an entry and postlanding battery has occurred. 
Ground-based failures include the Permion-separator failures (previously discussed) 
and the following problems. 
Low voltage occurred after vibration tests during qualification testing. The volt- 
age decrease was caused by groundpaths that resulted from electrolyte leakage f rom 
cracked cell cases. This problem was solved by reducing the cell-relief-valve p re s su re  
from 50 to 30 psig and increasing the internal corner radii i n  the molded cell ca ses  
(that is, making the corners  thicker and stronger). 
An incremental qualification test was performed on the entry and postlanding 
battery to determine if  it could withstand the increased vibration levels of the SM for 
use without shock mounting in spacecraft 009. The battery failed because of cell-case 
cracks; thus, it was shock mounted for flight. 
The two terminal-end cells of a battery in a laboratory became grounded by elec- 
trolyte leakage through cell-case cracks located directly behind the battery vent elbow. 
This failure was the result  of mishandling the elbow, which caused it to be jammed 
backward into the cell cases.  
Pyrotechnic Battery 
No inflight failure of a CM pyrotechnic battery has occurred. None of the ground 
failures was significant. to battery design o r  performance capabilities. 
Battery Charger 
No recorded fai lures  of the CM battery charger have occurred. Two chargers  
were damaged during laboratory testing because of incorrect connection of ac input 
power. 
LUNAR MODULE BATTERY-FAILURE EXPERIENCE 
Many LM battery failures have occurred; therefore, the failures are summarized 
in broad groupings. 
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Qua I i f  icat ion  -Test Fai I u res 
Qualification-test failures are summarized as follows. Descent-battery weld 
cracks occurred during the random vibration testing; the solutions to this problem 
included the following. 
1. On the basis of data obtained from vibration testing of an L M  test vehicle, the 
vibration levels were reduced. 
2. The inspection procedures were revised. 
3. A gusset was added on the mounting rail. 
Descent-battery cell-case cracks occurred after a -20" to 160" F thermal 
shock (unactivated) because of differential thermal expansion of the cell case and ther- 
mal fins in the battery case to which the cells were  potted. The following changes were 
made. 
1. The lower temperature was changed f rom -20" to 20" F, based on the ability 
to control shipment and storage temperatures easily within this limit. 
2. The cell-case walls were lubricated to prevent adhesion to the thermal fins. 
An ascent-battery voltage transient occurred below 28.0 volts (27.6 volts) when 
the thermal-vacuum discharge load w a s  changed from 50 to 80 amperes.  The specified 
voltage minimum was reduced to 27. 5 volts, based on a review of the capabilities of 
the voltage-limited equipment operated from the battery. The ED battery was  intern- 
ally grounded because of electrolyte leakage (caused by improper addition of electrolyte 
during activation). The activation procedure and equipment were improved. 
Acceptance-Test Fai lu res 
No ED-battery failures have occurred. However, two ascent-battery failures 
occurred: one because of low insulation resistance between the battery terminal and 
the case,  caused by inadequate drying of potting material, and the second because of 
broken cases  on sample cells, caused by vibration overtest. A s  of December 1969, 
26 descent-battery failures had occurred. All failures except one were  caused by im-  
proper processing, improper handling during fabrication, o r  improper testing. The 
one exceptional failure (low capacity) is still unexplained. 
Fai lures of Fl ight  Batteries Used in Vehicle Testing 
All but one of the 15 reported ED-battery fai lures  were caused by improper 
usage (that is, use beyond specified life or improper handling). In the one exception, 
the battery had a groundpath f rom terminal to case  that could not be analyzed because 
the battery was discharged completely through an external load after discovery of the 
ground. No significant ascent-battery problems occurred. Six descent-battery failures 
occurred because of cel ls  that  leaked electrolyte when the batteries were stood on end 
during activation o r  while the batteries were in a vehicle at the Kennedy Space Center. 
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The leakage was attributed to excess free electrolyte caused by a reduction of plate 
porosity in long-term storage a t  temperatures between 50" and 90" F. Requirements 
fo r  refrigerated storage were imposed. Also, a battery used in LM-4 t es t s  had low 
voltage in one cell after discharging 320 A-h in the laboratory before being returned to 
the vendor for  use as scrap. A lump of material found on a plate lug had punctured a 
separator,  causing loss  of cell capacity by means of a short between the positive and 
negative plates. Closer inspection by the vendor and hand cleaning of plate tabs were 
instituted to eliminate this type of failure. 
Fai lures of Batteries Prepared for Flight 
No ED-battery failures occurred. The one ascent-battery failure was caused by 
an apparent crack in one plastic cell cover at the flow mark near the fill screw. The 
flow mark was made to leak air slightly after extreme pressure cycling during the 
failure investigation. There had been no leakage before cycling. An inspection point 
was added to the test and checkout procedure to ensure that possible "leakers" would 
not get past  the battery shop. One descent-battery failure occurred because a cell was 
installed in the reversed-polarity position in  a battery, lowering the battery voltage by 
the equivalent of two cells. 
open-circuit voltages lower than required (37 .0  volts) by 0.005 volt or less. The open- 
circuit-voltage cri terion was reduced to 36 .98  volts. No battery failures occurred in 
flight. The incident involving battery 2 on the Apollo 1 3  flight (following section) did 
not diminish the ability of that battery to continue to deliver power in a normal manner. 
Three failures occurred because activated batteries had 
APOLLO 13 BATTERY EXPERIENCE 
During the Apollo 1 3  cryogenic-oxygen-system failure and the subsequent inabil- 
ity to operate the CSM fuel cells, the CSM first obtained power (approximately 
400 watts) f rom one entry and postlanding battery. Subsequently, the CSM/LM assem- 
bly was switched onto LM-battery power. The spacecraft was powered down to 
350 watts. Intermittent spikes of an additional 7 0  watts occurred as heaters cycled on 
and off. Approximately 97 hours into the mission, the LM pilot reported "a little 
thump" in the LM descent stage. Within a few minutes, he reported snowflakes in the 
area of descent-stage quad IV, in  which descent batteries 1 and 2 were mounted. From 
a review of the telemetry data., it was concluded that, at the t ime of the reported thump, 
a n  apparent short  circuit of approximately 100 to  150 amperes  occurred between the 
battery 1 and 2 electrical control assembly and the battery 2 ground. The battery 2 
malfunction light subsequently cycled on and off for approximately 1 day, even though 
all batteries performed nominally for the remainder of the mission. This malfunction- 
light cycling was attributed to a malfunction of the battery 2 overtemperature- sensing 
circuitry. 
s enso r s  do not activate at temperatures less than 140" F. 
The battery temperature was approximately 37 " F, and the overtemperature 
F rom the foregoing information, it was inferred (but never proved) that electro- 
lyte escaped from some cells in battery 2,  was displaced to the terminal end of the 
battery by the transearth descent-engine burn, and shorted a positive terminal to the 
battery case  (mounted to a grounding structure). This short  could have ignited the hy- 
drogen and oxygen mixture under the battery cover, causing the thump and a n  efflux 
of electrolyte f rom the battery, which produced snowflakes. The capability of such a 
short  to car ry  the estimated fault cur ren ts  was verified by a battery test performed by 
a contractor. 
On the premise that the postulated failure sequence might be valid and because 
the quantity of electrolyte in  the descent-battery cells was considered to be higher than 
was necessary to obtain full battery capacity on discharge, a program of correct ive 
redesign and investigation was initiated. The significant findings and design improve- 
ments a r e  summarized in the following sections. 
Findings 
Twenty cubic centimeters (5.6 percent of 360 cubic'centimeters) of the electro- 
lyte in a descent-battery cell could be removed from a cell without affecting its ability 
to deliver capacity (420 to 450 A-h using 360 cubic centimeters compared with the speci- 
fied 400 A-h). This reduction of electrolyte volume became a design change. 
Cells that had plates more than 280 days old (from completion of the plate-making 
processes  until the day of activation), whether s tored refrigerated or  unrefrigerated, 
absorbed significantly l e s s  electrolyte than did younger cells and tended to leak. Cells 
that had plates younger than 280 days caused no problems. No work was done or  is 
planned to identify and define the mechanism of this plate behavior. 
While on discharge, silver-oxide/zinc pr imary cells can evolve significant 
amounts of oxygen. Volumes greater  than 50 percent of the effluent cell gas  were 
measured. Work is planned to identify and define the basis  for this behavior, which is 
believed to be related to the plate-formation process ,  formation-bath temperature and 
composition, drying conditions, and plate storage t ime and temperature before 
activation. 
Design I mprovements 
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The inside surfaces  of the battery container and lid were coated with two l aye r s  
of insulating, alkali-resistant paint. Individual cell vents were manifolded together 
and were  vented external to the battery through a relief valve. This design provided a 
path overboard of the battery for any electrolyte that leaked from the cell vents and 
substantially reduced the volume of any detonatable gas  mixtures that came from in- 
side the cells. An analog temperature sensor  was removed f rom the battery because 
it was no longer used in  flight and because it complicated potting of the inside of the 
battery. To have both ascent-battery terminals  at the same end of the battery (which 
was a single row of 20 cells), the terminal lead f rom the cell at the far end of the bat- 
t e ry  r an  the full length of the inside of the battery and emerged at the terminal end. 
In lieu of this arrangement,  the design was revised to have a terminal at each end of the 
battery. This redesign eliminated both an  internal potting complexity and a possible 
source of internal shorts.  The internal battery potting, which had previously covered 
all current-conducting pa r t s  but had not adhered reliably to some parts,  was revised 
SO that it adhered properly and extended over the entire top surfaces  of all cells. This 
potting reduced the possibility of internal grounds caused by escaped electrolyte. 
A s  an improvement to the overall Apollo spacecraft, an LM descent battery was 
added to subsecpent service modules (fig. 17). This battery could have provided 
12 kWh of emergency energy and was designated the SM auxiliary battery. It could 
be connected t o  the CM main buses through the distribution system for  fuel cell 
number 2. 
Figure 17. - Location of auxiliary battery in sector IV of the SM. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The design features and methods of development, qualification, acceptance test- 
ing, activation, and preinstallation checkout of all the Apollo command-service module 
and lunar module batteries have prevented inflight failures, with the possible unproved 
exception of auxiliary battery 2 on the Apollo 6 spacecraft. 
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Two major conclusions, both based on the Apollo 7 problems, a r e  made. First, 
untried and novel components (such a s  new separator  mater ia ls)  should not be used in 
batteries unless no other feasible, standard alternative exists. Second, each space- 
craft  system design (such as charging circuits)  must be verified quantitatively, either 
in a flight vehicle o r  in an  accurate  simulation, to avoid unexpected developments in  
flight. 
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